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Abstract2
Does the class of shareholdings matter for corporate performance?  To address the question, our
paper starts by classifying shareholdings on the basis of the principle of ultimate ownership.  At
present, the shareholding structure of Chinese quoted companies is state-dominant in that 84% of
public companies ultimately are found controlled by the state, compared with 16% of non-state-
controlled ones. In contrast to our identified shareholdings, the Chinese official shareholding
record only reports the state and the legal person share classes that are inevitably ambiguous for
the identification of ultimate owners of public corporations, which in turn has misled many
previous studies in assessing the impact of shareholding classes on performance. Based on our
newly established shareholding classes, we make a nested performance comparison between these
different classes, such as the state direct control versus the state indirect control, and find
significant evidence from the Chinese data that the class of shareholdings does matter for
company performance. The least inefficient shareholding class is the holding companies that are
wholly listed and have focused industrial business through the state indirect control of the
downstream public corporations. This finding provides ground for us to think more about how the
corporate control mechanism could be further improved in China’s current corporate governance
reform.
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2I. Introduction
The relationship of ownership and control to firm performance has long been a topic
under intensive discussion in economic literature since Berle and Means (1932). Broadly
speaking, two interrelated dimensions have been developed to analyse firms’ ownership
and control structure, namely the concentration of shareholdings/the degree of control
and the identity or class of controlling shareholders. Regarding the former dimension, the
traditional literature has mostly focused on the testing of the hypothetically different
performance impacts between owner-controlled firms and manager-controlled firms by
identifying a cut-off shareholding level to distinguish the two types (Short, 1994), while
the recent discussion has centred on the merits and weaknesses of concentrated
shareholdings with special reference to corporate performance (Shleifer & Vishny, 1986,
1997; Bolton & von Thadden, 1998).
Comparatively, the literature on the latter issue is rather underdeveloped. Although some
hypothesis has been proposed that external controlling shareholders outperform internal
ones in ensuring the firm’s value-maximisation objective (e.g. Nickell, Nicolitsas &
Dryden, 1997), and some research has been conducted on the effect upon corporate
performance of a certain class of controlling shareholders, such as top management (e.g.
Morck, Shleifer & Vishny, 1988), institutional investors (e.g. McConnell & Servaes,
1990), and banks (e.g. Edwards & Fischer, 1994; Franks & Mayer, 2001), systematic and
conclusive evidence on the performance effects of various shareholding classes remains
sparse, notably in emerging markets and developing economies.
Moreover, according to the recent development in the theory of firm’s ownership
structure and its associated control mechanism, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer
(1999) provide a detailed account on the various means controlling shareholders can use
to maintain and extend their de facto control in firms, including superior voting rights,
cross-shareholdings and pyramid shareholding schemes, etc. Specifically, the pyramid
structure is applied by controlling shareholders to create a set of control chains, within
which a publicly listed company may be controlled by another one, whose controlling
shares in turn lie, directly or through several such similar chains, in the hands of the
ultimate dominant shareholder group. So the immediate ownership data from the public
corporations is not, in principle, adequate to present an accurate picture of the exact
control pattern in these firms, and the tracing of ultimate shareholding structure is quite
crucial to our understanding of the ownership and control in modern corporations.
However, despite the pioneering work conducted by La Porta et al (1999) on establishing
the stylised fact of the corporate ownership structure around the world3, there is little
work investigating empirically whether there is any significant performance impacts
induced by the various control mechanisms that are used by the dominant shareholders.
For example, do different pyramidal structures, such as different types of shareholding
identities in the intermediate control chain, tend to be associated with different firm
performance, though the ultimate controlling shareholders being identical?
                                                
3 Their methodology has subsequently applied into the analysis of the corporate ownership structure in East
Asian economies by Claessens, Djankov, & Lang (2000) and in West European economies by Faccio &
Lang (forthcoming).
3This is a key question that the paper aims to look at, a relationship between shareholding
class and corporate performance, through the empirical investigation into the effect of the
state as the ultimate controlling shareholder on the performance of Chinese public
corporations.  Indeed, the extensive state control has been found in a number of countries
such as Austria and Singapore in La Porta et al’s sample, but unfortunately, China is not
included in their dataset. How could the government in China, the most populous country
in the world with a fast growing power for economic prosperity, manage to maintain their
control over most of the public listed companies during its economic transition? What are
the characteristics of pyramidal structure the Chinese government employs to achieve its
ultimate control? What are, if any, the complicated performance impacts upon the listed
companies of the ultimate state control? Answers to these questions are worth exploring
not only for the understanding of the interplay between ownership, control and corporate
performance in general, but also for that of corporate governance mechanisms in
emerging markets and transition economies in particular.
Our investigation begins with an attempt to identify the ultimate shareholding structure of
Chinese publicly listed companies following the ultimate ownership principle proposed
by La Porta et al (1999). Then we examine whether there is any discernable difference in
company performance associated with different control forms used by the state.  That is
to say, is there any performance difference between companies directly controlled by
government agencies and those indirectly controlled by the government via various
pyramidal structures? And even within the pyramid category, the state can ultimately
control the firms through different types of institutions in the intermediate control chain.
Then, for example, does it matter for the government to choose state-controlled
corporations or professional asset management firms as the intermediate agent to exercise
its ultimate control rights?  It is the performance variance among different control forms
that we suppose is firstly investigated in the paper to add our understandings of the
complex relationship between shareholding structure and firm performance.
The next section of the paper describes the main characteristics of the shareholding
structure in Chinese public corporations, and casts doubt on the validity of the
methodology applied by previous literature in discussing the relationship between
ownership structure and corporate performance in China. In the third section, starting
with the introduction of our analytical framework and a brief description of the data and
performance indicators, we focus on the presentation of our empirical results and
interpretations. Concluding remarks, as usual, are provided in the last part of the paper.
II. Shareholding Structure in Chinese Publicly Listed Companies
One basic feature of the shareholding structure in Chinese public corporations is the
predominance of ultimate state control, which is quite different from other emerging
markets and transitional economies where private ownership tends to be in a dominant
position. The state-dominant structure, as we shall elaborate shortly, lies in the fact that
the state is in the ultimate and absolute control of 84% of all publicly quoted companies
via two control patterns: (1) government direct control of 8.5% of the quoted companies,
and (2) government indirect control of 75.6% of the quoted companies via pyramid
4shareholding schemes (see Table 1). Within the pyramid group of state indirectly
controlled quoted companies, there are 15 companies identified according to La Porta et
al’s (1999) definition of pyramid shareholding schemes4, while 821 companies have non-
listed state-owned institutions or companies as their largest controlling shareholders5.
Table 1 shows that, on average, the top shareholder of each quoted company holds some
44% of the total shares outstanding, which is far above the 20% cut-off level used by La
Porta et al (1999) to identify a controlling shareholder (see footnote 4). Based on the
criterion, we group the largest shareholders into eight classes to indicate their economic
status and their ultimate owners in Table 1. Our classification is shown to be markedly
departed from the Chinese official grouping of shares according to state shares, legal
person shares, employee shares and the tradable A shares (issued for individual
investors), in which in 2001 they respectively accounted for 46%, 18%, 0.5% and 25% of
the total shares outstanding6.
One problem of the official grouping is that it fails to identify the ownership identity of
legal persons, defined as an enterprise or economic entity with a legal status, and it is
unclear about if these legal entities are state-owned or non-state-owned institutions. It is
quite possible that the owners of the legal person shares are enterprises or institutions
ultimately controlled by the central or a local government. If so, grouping the legal
person shares to an independent shareholding class in parallel with the state shares and
public shares would be inappropriate, since the state controls the legal person who in turn
controls the firm, and so the ultimate owner of the firm is the state, not the legal person
itself. Therefore, the category of legal person shares is in effect an irrelevant concept
when discussing the relationship of shareholding class to firm performance, because, to
put it simply, they are not qualified to act as independent ultimate controlling
shareholding identity for Chinese publicly traded companies. And classifying the shares
held by the state controlled legal persons to a single share class independent from the
state is misleading for the study of performance impacts of various share classes, but
unfortunately this misunderstanding is fairly common in previous literature. For example,
Xu & Wang (1997, 1999), Chen (2001), and Sun, Tong & Tong (2002)’s works are all
based on such ad hoc classification7.
                                                
4 A pyramid on the 20 or 10 percent definition should satisfy two conditions: (1) there exists an ultimate
owner of the firm in question; (2) there is at least one publicly traded company between the firm and the
ultimate owner in the chain of 20/10 percent voting rights. So if the intermediate company within the
control chain happens to be a non-listed company, the case cannot be designated as “pyramid”.
5 In this paper, we relax the strict specification of pyramid in La Porta et al (1999) and let non-listed
domestic holding companies enter our discussion due to the unique feature of China’s shareholding
structure and state control. We believe that the loose definition of pyramid is particularly instrumental in
obtaining the real picture of the ultimate shareholding structure in Chinese public companies.
6 The figures are calculated from the data provided on the website of the China Securities Regulatory
Commission: http://www.csrc.gov.cn.
7 As Tian (2001) rightly points out, “ the above classification was to facilitate the regulation of the trading
activities rather than classifying the investors”.
5Table 1. Who ultimately controls China’s Public Listed Companies
2001?
Status of the largest shareholder of a firm No of firms as % of the
total number listed in
the market
Average shares held by
the largest shareholder as
% of total shares issued
State as the ultimate controlling shareholder
Direct control:
   Government departments or agencies          8.5%  (94 firms)     39.6% (16.1)
Indirect control:
   State-owned enterprises       75.6%   (836 firms)     47.3% (17.6)
  In which of SOEs:
  (1a) State-controlled public-listed firms       1.4%     (15 firms)     52.3% (20.8)
  (2a) State solely-owned companies8       32.6%   (360 firms)     49.7%  (16.7)
  (3a) State controlled non-listed
companies9
      40.6%   (449 firms)     45.4%  (17.9)
  (4a) State owned academic institutions       1.1%     (12 firms)     39.0%  (14.1)
 Total of State Controlled Enterprises      84.1% (930 firms)     46.5% (17.6)
Non-State-Owned Organisations as the ultimate controlling shareholder
(1b) Non-state-controlled public-listed firms       0.4% (4 firms)     37.7% (24.9)
(2b) Non -listed collective firms & TVEs       7.0% (77 firms)     38.3% (16.9)
(3b) Non -listed domestic private firms       7.5%  (83 firms)     33.3% (11.6)
(4b) Non -listed foreign private firms       1%     (10 firms)     25.8% (6.5)
Total of Non-State Controlled Enterps.     15.9% (174 firms)     34.8% (14.7)
Grand total of Number of firms in the sample      100.0%  (1105 firms)     44.6%
Note: (1) According to China Securities Regulatory Commission, the number of companies listed in
December 2001 was 1160, in which 95.3% of the total listed companies have responded to our survey on
the economic class of their largest shareholders in 2001.  The survey was conducted by this study April
2002. (2) Brackets by the percentage of shares are standard deviation of the average shares.
To further elaborate the ultimate ownership classification which is proposed by La Porta
et al (1999), we trace down the complex control chain of Chinese publicly listed
companies to their ultimate owners. This enables us to illustrate, first, the serious
misspecification of the legal person shares as an independent class from the state, and
                                                
8 This is a special type of company after the corporatisation in China, since there is no shareholders meeting
in these firms, while the board of directors are directly appointed by state department or state-authorised
investment institutions “to exercise a part of functions and powers of the shareholders meeting and to make
decisions on important matters of the company”. “However, the merger, division, dissolution, increase and
reduction of capital, and issuance of company bonds must be decided by the state-authorized investment
institution or by the department authorized by the State.” (Company Law of the PRC, 1999)
9 Comparative to state solely-owned companies, the general state controlled non-listed companies shall
have the shareholders meeting because various state departments may have different levels of stakes in
these companies, and it even could be the case that some domestic or overseas non-state companies hold
some minority shares in the firms. In the same vein, all the fundamental decisions concerning merger and
dissolution etc should be at least formally decided upon in the shareholders meeting.
secondly, the picture of how the pyramid is applied by the state to reform its control
mechanism.
Our first case is Inner Mongolia Mengdian Huaneng, a thermal power corporation listed
on the Shanghai Stock Exchange. It is shown in Figure 1 that, the state asset bureau, as
the third largest equity holder, directly controls 7.9% voting rights10 in 2000, while the
two largest shareholders are the Inner Mongolia Electricity Company (62.4% of shares
outstanding) and the Huaneng Group Corporation (13.2% of total shares). If we strictly
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(62.4% + 13.2% + 7.9%) rather than 7.9% alone shown in the official statistical record,
and the company in question should not be expected to operate too differently from a
wholly state-owned company. Nevertheless, if we are misled to just uncritically refer to
the state stockholding size of 7.9%, the exact magnitude of state shareholding and its
control will be severely underestimated and unbiased assessment of the relationship
between shareholding structure and firm performance is therefore hard to obtain.
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8subsidiary of China National Aero-Technology Import & Export Corporation (CATIC),
holding more than a quarter of the total shares. And the next two large shareholders are
respectively the Shanghai Xinya Group Company and the China New Era (Xin Shidai)
Holding Group Company, in which each holds roughly the same amount of 10% shares.
Once again, the three holding institutions are found subject to the ultimate control of
central and local government. Specifically, the CATIC is owned by two parts of China
Aviation Industry Corporation (AVIC), which is in turn under the direction of the State
Council. The Shanghai Xinya Group is established by the Shanghai Municipal
Government, majoring in hotel industry and tourism, and the New Era Group is a
diversified firm ranging from high-technology business to real estate development, also
fully controlled by the central government. But ironically, the state shareholding level in
the Shenzhen Nan-Guang Group is reported zero in the official record! Obviously, the
real scale of state control in the group should at least take into account the legal person
shares held by the three state-controlled companies.
Our third case is Tianjin Jinbin Development Co. Ltd, shown in Figure 3, which has two
large shareholders: one with 40.5% shares is TEDA Construction Group Company that is a
100% subsidiary of Tianjin Economic-and-Technological Development Area (TEDA), and
TEDA itself is a subsidiary department of the Tianjin Municipal Government. For the
second largest shareholder, the Tianjian Huatai Group, is truly a non-state company
holding 33.5% of the total shares outstanding. In this case the official report on state
shares in Jinbin Development is 40.5%, exactly equal to the fraction of shares held by the
solely state-owned TEDA Construction Group.
Figure 3.  Tianjin Jinbin Development Co.Ltd.  This company is ultimately controlled by
Tianjin Municipal Government who owns 100% of TEDA. In turn, TEDA owns 100% of its subsidiary of
TEDA Construction Group Company that holds 40.5% of the stake in the Jinbin Development.  The
Tianjian Huatai as the second largest shareholder is a non-state controlled company.  In this case, the
official report on the company’s state shares was 40.5%, exactly equal to the number of shares held by the
largest shareholder that is state-owned.
Tianjin Jinbin
Development Co. Ltd
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9The illustration of the three cases raises three points.  First, the state has extended its
ownership from direct control to non-direct control via a pyramid shareholding scheme,
and the control via the pyramid structure has become prevalent in Chinese quoted
companies as suggested in Table 1.
Secondly, China’s official shareholding classification is inconsistent with the ultimate
ownership principle. One example is the official defined concept of legal person shares
that is ambiguous about who is an ultimate controlling shareholder of ‘the legal person’.
The ambiguity could result in misconceptions in analysing the shareholding structure for
China’s quoted companies. For instance, one influential study of the relationship between
ownership structure and corporate performance, Xu and Wang (1997, 1999) found a
positive correlation between the fraction of legal person shares and firms’ profitability,
and a negative correlation between the fraction of state shares and profitability. They
interpreted the results by equating the legal person shares to institutional shares, and so
ascribed all the merits of institutional shareholders in industrial countries to the Chinese
legal persons. The interpretation of legal person shares in this way is inconsistent with
China’s institutional context, because the legal person shares could represent a degree of
state control via an indirect control form, as shown in our three cases, in which they are
fundamentally different from the widely held institutional shareholders in western
economies, such as insurance companies, mutual funds, pension funds and so on.
Thirdly, it is not correct to classify all legal person shares to ‘the class of the state
holding’, since Table 1 shows that there were 174 non-state-owned quoted companies in
2001, and they are also called ‘the legal person’ by the official classification. To pool the
state holding and the legal person holding into one class in parallel with other classes for
comparative performance study was evident in the study of Sun, Tong and Tong (2002).
The study proposed indifference between state shareholders and legal person
shareholders in Chinese public corporations, so that they regressed the sum of state
shareholdings and legal person shares, as a proxy of government control, with
performance measures of Chinese PLCs. Apparently, the work is arbitrary or biased since
it overestimates the exact shareholding size of the state in their firm sample, as the class
of legal person entities consists of 16% of the quoted companies that are non-state-
controlled.
To sum up, previous studies on Chinese shareholding structure and corporate
performance failed to achieve an accurate identification of the ultimate state shareholding
size and control power in Chinese PLCs to varying degrees. Therefore their empirical
findings on the relationship between state shareholding and firm performance, whether
the unambiguous negative correlation (Xu & Wang; 1997,1999) or the U-shaped
correlation (Tian, 2001)11 or even the inverse U-shaped one (Sun et al, 2002), must be
treated with a pinch of salt, if not deemed as outright spurious.
                                                
11 Although Tian (2001) attempted to deal with the ambiguous shareholding classification of the legal
person shares by strictly applying La Porta et al’s pyramid concept to define those under public state
corporation control to be state-owned, he missed a large number of corporations under the control of non-
public-listed state owned companies. As a result, either his study might be biased by defining the missing
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As a result, departing from the legal-person-based studies, we apply the ultimate
ownership classification proposed by La Porta et al (1999) to redefine the shareholding
structure of Chinese quoted companies in terms of the state ultimate control versus the
private ultimate control.  Furthermore, we break down the state holdings to two classes of
shareholdings: (1) government direct control via its agencies to directly hold more than
20% voting shares, and (2) government indirect control via its owned or controlled
corporations to exercise their decisive voting shares. Within the category of government
indirect control, intermediate companies used in the control chain include: state solely
owned companies (33% of the total quoted firms in 2001), state controlled publicly listed
companies (1.4%), non-quoted state owned companies (44%), and state-owned academic
institutions (1.1%). These four types of intermediate companies consist of the Chinese-
styled pyramid shareholding schemes, which extends La Porta et al’s pyramid concept to
the context of China’s enterprise reform.
III.  Does the Class of Shareholdings Matter for Performance?
3.1 Analytical framework
One advantage of establishing the Chinese-styled pyramid shareholding schemes is to
enable us to examine the agency problem of the ultimate owner in using different classes
of shareholdings as ‘controlling instruments’ to direct the public companies.  A specific
class of shareholding represents an economic status of the controlling shareholder in a
firm. For example, the class of the government direct shareholding implies that a
government department or agency is chosen to be the proxy for the ultimate owner of the
state to control the firm. Alternatively, the ultimate owner can choose a business
enterprise as “the controlling shareholder” to act on behalf of the owner in monitoring the
firm.  If a firm has (1) an ultimate owner and (2) a controlling shareholder that is an
intermediate institution or company chosen to act on behalf of the ultimate owner, then
agency problems will arise in the pyramid control chain.  Since a shareholding class
represents a certain type of holding companies’ strength of motivation and monitoring in
corporate control, a level of business knowledge, and advantage in accessing resources
brought to its controlled firms, the quality of control will certainly vary among different
classes of the controlling companies or shareholders.  Thus, how to find a controlling
shareholder as an agent capable of maximising the ultimate owner’s interests will then be
a basic concern in determining a shareholding class and the control structure of the firm.
Following this line of reasoning, if a shareholding class is given and the interest of the
ultimate owner of the state is to improve efficiency and so profitability of the firms, we
can then assess which shareholding class has the least agency costs relative to others by
comparing profit performance of different shareholding classes. For most of the Chinese
quoted companies with the identical ultimate ownership of the state, this means that the
performance comparison of different shareholding classes will reveal information on the
least inefficient class of the controlling mechanisms applied by the Chinese government
                                                                                                                                                
part of the corporations as non-stated controlled, or unrepresentative of the population since its pyramid
sample of 19 companies (and 4 of 19 are non-state-controlled) was too small to mean something.
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on reforming its corporate control. Therefore, Chinese state controlled quoted companies
are the focus of our comparative analysis.
Figure 4 provides a nested framework of different shareholding mechanisms taken by the
governments to retain the state ultimate control of Chinese PLCs. This provides a unique
opportunity for us, as suggested before, to examine the complicated impacts of various
shareholding schemes upon corporate performance. First of all, our performance
comparison is made on the basis of the group of quoted companies under the state direct
control versus the group of quoted companies under the state indirect control, and in
Figure 4 we call it Class 1 of shareholdings versus Class 2 of shareholdings.  The state
direct control means that the state uses government departments, such as state asset
management bureau, to hold controlling voting shares directly. Alternatively, the control
of the PLCs can be achieved by creating pyramidal schemes, in which the state employs a
corporation or institution to act on behalf of him in exercising the share-voting power.
How this indirect control differs from the direct control in affecting corporate
performance is an interesting question to be looked at.
Secondly, within the broad category of the indirect control, the Chinese government
employs two types of domestic institutions to act as the controlling shareholders of the
companies. One is the Asset Management Companies established and solely owned by
local governments, whose official objective is to “preserve and enhance the value of state
assets” through portfolio investment in various companies of different industries12. The
other type of entities in the intermediate layer of the control chain is the state-controlled
industrial companies. Within the indirect control, the companies are further grouped
according to their controlling shareholders: asset management companies (Class 22)
versus industrial companies (Class 21), for performance comparison.
Why do firms diversify? Can diversified firms outperform non-diversified or specialised
(or focused) firms?  These are the third question addressed by our comparative analysis
of two classes of shareholdings: the diversified conglomerates as the controlling
shareholders (Class 211) versus the specialised or focused corporations as the controlling
shareholders (Class 212), in which corporations in these two groups are selected from the
Class 21 of industrial companies under the state indirect control.
Fourthly, within the specialised group of industrial companies, we further break the group
down to two classes according to the firms’ listing structure: the category of wholly listed
corporations (Class 211-2) that refers to the companies or company groups which are
initially floated on the stock market as a whole, evidenced by the fact that the controlling
shareholder of these companies are substantively the listed firms themselves from the
business point of view, notwithstanding the de jure different legal person identities. On
                                                
12 For example, the Shenzhen Asset Management Company is the majority shareholder (59.95%) of the
Shenzhen Shenbao Industrial Co. Ltd (Securities Code 0019), a publicly quoted company in food and
beverage industry. Directly managed by the Shenzhen Municipal Government, the asset management firm
also holds varying amount of shares in another 21 companies listed in the Shenzhen Stock Exchange and 3
companies listed in Hong Kong, ranging from telecommunication industry to pharmaceutical and
petrochemical industries.
12
the contrary, the partially listed corporations (Class 211-1), as the name suggests, are in
fact affiliated with their larger parent/holding companies.
For example, the Chongqing Taiji Industry (Group) Co. Ltd (Securities Code: 600129)
can be identified as a wholly listed corporation. This is due to the fact that the its
controlling shareholder, which holds 58.81% of the company shares, is also called the
Taiji Group Limited, and a further inspection reveals that the board chairman of the listed
Taiji is concurrently the board chairman and CEO in the holding Taiji Group Limited and
most of the board directors in the listed Taiji come from the top management in the
holding Taiji13. In contrast, as a case of partially listed company, the Qilu Petrochemical
Company Ltd. (Securities Code: 600002) has the China Petroleum & Chemical
Corporation (Sinopec) as its parent company to hold 82.05% of its total shares. Actually
before the floatation the Qilu Petrochemical Company was just a subsidiary of the
Sinopec in the Shandong Province.
From an agency point of view, one distinction between the two classes is that an inside
corporate agency who is directly involved in business is delegated the voting power to
direct the use of the owner’s assets in the wholly listed case; in contrast, an outside
corporate agency, who in turn hires another agency to operate business, is delegated the
voting power to decide use of the owner’s assets in the partially listed case.
3.2 Data and Performance Indicators
Accounting data on all Chinese quoted companies from 1993 to 2000, and top-10
shareholder information from 1997 to 2000, are provided by the Securities Intelligent
Unit of China Economy Daily that collects data from each company’s annual report and
edits them into a panel dataset.
To demonstrate performance information as much as possible, we employed a set of
performance indicators computed from our dataset for the period of 1997 to 2000.  Our
firm-level performance indicators include: profits made during a year, economic value
added during a year, a rate of profit return to the net assets, a rate of economic value
added to invested capital, sales growth, profit margin in the total sales revenue.
Profits and a profit-asset rate per annum are straight given by the annual report of each
quoted company, and then we averaged the profits and the profit return rate of the
companies in terms of a subject group in question. By taking into account the sample
size (observations) different between the two comparing groups, the mean values of
different groups of the companies are compared with p-statistic values.
Profit margin is the ratio of profits to sales revenue, aimed to look at if high profit
performance is a result of good market, or the market power of the suppliers, that enables
the firm to raise prices.  Sales growth indicates competitiveness of firms’ products or
services in the market.
                                                
13 One interesting finding is that the two Taijis share the same website and the same company address in the
Chongqing city.
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3.3 Empirical Results and Interpretations
As can be seen in Table 2, on the average of the annual performance of the listed
companies from 1997 to 2000, the profits per firm, the rate of profit return to capital,
EVA-capital ratio and sales growth of the indirect control shareholdings are significantly
higher than the group of the corporations under the direct control. The finding is not at all
surprising, which is consistent with the existing economic literature on the defects of
governmental bureaucrats in company management. In general, bureaucrats are not
Table 2 Performance Comparison between the Government Direct Control and the
Government Indirect Control
(Shareholding Class 1 Versus Class 2)
EVA per
firm
 million
yuan
Profits per
firm
 million
yuan
EVA-
capital
ratio
Profit-
asset ratio
Profit
margin
Sales
growth
No of
observat
ions
Direct
Control
(Std Dev)
-16.516
(39.826)
36.993
(48.213)
-0.019
(0.055)
0.073
(0.071)
0.26
(0.148)
1.15
(0.644)
1602
34.4%
Indirect
Control
(Std Dev)
-13.899
(69.428)
67.127
(96.229)
-0.012
(0.061)
0.084
(0.072)
0.259
(0.151)
1.36
(1.478)
1995
 34%
P-value 0.486 0.001 0.024 0.005 0.862 0.008
granted any cash flow rights of the firms they control so they have meagre incentives to
guarantee the firms in line with the efficient improvement, a classic agency problem
pervasive in reality. Secondly, relative to professional managers, government officials are
lack of sufficient business knowledge and skills required for the effective monitoring and
management of the companies under their control, exacerbating the further agency
problem between them and their managed firms.
Our results clearly indicate that bureaucrats in the central and local governments are less
capable of performing the role of a dominant shareholder that is supposed to perform in
monitoring or supervising the firm when compared with the managers of state-controlled
but commercialized companies such as state-owned asset management firms. This is not
to say that the latter are totally immune to the aforementioned fundamental defects, but
the situation does seem milder because they are comparatively more business-oriented
than government officials. Focused on “preserving and enhancing state asset values” as
the namely foremost objectives of these organisations, managers there might be less
vulnerable to the arbitrary political interference and policy burdens. More importantly,
considering that their own promotion prospects might be influenced by the performance
of the firms they once controlled, these managers may have some incentives to monitor
their affiliated public corporations on the basis of profitability. On the other hand,
although they are not entirely as same as the professional managerial class in Western
countries, they are definitely more competent and informed than government officials to
supervise and control the public corporations.
15
With the gradual progress of the economic reform in China, it becomes less and less
popular for the central government and local governments to directly involve in the
enterprise management. For the part of central government, it chooses to incorporate the
SOEs and create state holding companies, in the hope of transforming the large SOEs
into real modern business organisations while still maintaining at least indirect state
control and avoiding the devastating mass privatisation that happened in East-European
transition economies. It is hoped that the separation of enterprise and government can be
achieved through the corporatisation of large SOEs by the creation of state holding
companies, which may serve as a “firewall” between the operating companies and
politicians.
On the other hand, the regional decentralization in the 1980s, the fiscal reform in the
1990s and the intensification of the cross-regional competition in the product markets all
contributed to the hardening of the budget constraints on local governments, which
means that local governments have to assume the primary responsibility for managing
local economies and are entitled to part of their own regional revenues as well. Then
motivated by the Chinese-style Federalism (Cao, Qian & Weingast, 1999), local
governments have established a variety of firms and asset management companies to
further control the downstream firms in promising and lucrative industries they deem14.
Among all kinds of the intermediate companies the state has formed, a further detailed
comparison of the performance impacts upon the Chinese PLCs that different classes of
controlling shareholders may exert is further explored below.
Table 3. Performance Comparison between the Asset Management Company
Shareholdings and the Industrial Company Shareholdings
(Shareholding Class 21 VS Class 22)
EVA per
firm
(million
yuan)
Profits per
firm
(million
yuan)
EVA-
Capital
Ratio
Profit-
asset
ratio
Profit
margin
Sales
growth
No of
observat
ions
Asset
Mnmgt
companies
(Std Dev)
-12.464
(29.934)
43.331
(37.218)
-0.0078
(0.035)
0.081
(0.045)
0.235
(0.121)
1.28
(1.011)
141
Industrial
companies
(Std Dev)
-12.139
(71.527)
70.323
(99.878)
-0.011
(0.061)
0.085
(0.072)
0.262
(0.154)
1.37
(1.518)
1824
P-value 0.957 0.0014 0.472 0.481 0.047 0.4474
As Table 3 has shown, in terms of the profits made per firm, the significant
underperformance of public corporations controlled by asset management company
shareholdings appears when compared with those held by the industrial company ones.
One possible reason to the underperformance is that asset management companies are
likely to indulge themselves in controlling a large number of corporations in a wide range
                                                
14 It is also argued that such factors of institutional change are the driving force of local governments to
privatise their enterprises to supply more incentives with the managers and to improve the enterprises’
competitiveness, which in turn increase their fiscal revenues (Li, Li & Zhang, 2000).
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of mutually unrelated projects or industries, like the case mentioned in the footnote 12.
Although the rudimentary principle of portfolio management and risk diversification
could justify their wide range of business involvement, the risk of business failure is
likely to fuel up owing to the lack of monitoring input and management competence in
project control.
Another possible interpretation of the underperformance is that, managers in asset
management firms may neither have enough information nor required expertise to
exercise effective control of their subsidiaries, apart from the common incentive problem
inhabited in all kinds of state-controlled shareholders. Specifically, our conjecture is that
the managers in asset management firms are more likely to come from former
government bureaucrats rather than managers in traditional State-owned Enterprises
(SOEs).
Table 4 shows the performance comparison between the group of corporations controlled
by the focused or specialised industrial enterprises as holding companies and the group
controlled by the diversified conglomerates as holding companies. Obviously, the
specialised shareholding class outperforms those controlled by the diversified
conglomerates in profit performance and sales growth. Although a stylised empirical fact
shows that focused public corporations perform better than diversified ones in emerging
markets, there has been little evidence to show that public corporations under the
shareholding control of the focused companies outperform significantly the ones under
the control of the diversified companies, implying the importance of the class of
shareholdings to the performance of be-controlled firms.
Table 4. Performance Comparison Between the Specialised Industrial Company
Shareholdings and the Diversified Conglomerate Shareholdings
(Shareholding Class 211 VS Class 212)
EVA per
firm
(million
yuan)
Profits per
firm
(million
yuan)
EVA-
Capital
Ratio
Profit-
Asset
Ratio
Profit
margin
Sales
growth
No of
observat
ions
Specialised
firms
(Std Dev)
-10.71
(86.091)
78.768
(109.45)
-0.011
(0.057)
0.087
(0.066)
0.256
(0.147)
1.33
(1.35)
1402
Diversified
firms
(Std Dev)
-10.937
(57.846)
48.167
(81.674)
-0.012
(0.068)
0.079
(0.087)
0.282
(0.171)
1.52
(1.973)
422
P-value 0.959 0.0001 0.777 0.049 0.002 0.027
Nevertheless, existing theories on the raison d’etre and the performance consequence of
corporate diversification still serve as a good starting point. Why do firms diversify?
Theoretically, they may diversify to substitute external markets by establishing internal
capital markets in the hope of saving market transaction costs (Coase, 1937; Williamson,
1985). Empirically, Khanna and Palepu (2000) find such hypothesis testified by the fact
that affiliates of the most Indian diversified groups outperform unaffiliated firms in their
1993 sample. Equally important, it is also traditionally legitimate to justify corporate
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diversification by elaborating the potential gains of economies of scope and scale, the
learning-by-doing effect and the like (e.g. Penrose, 1959).
The costs of corporate diversification, however, always outweigh the potential gains in
reality, as evidenced by the pernicious effects of diversification upon corporate
performance documented in Asian emerging markets (e.g. Claessens, Djankov, Fan &
Lang, 1998; Lins & Servaes, 2002; Mitton, 2002). In fact, as a substitute of external
markets, the internal capital allocation within diversified groups is far from efficient and
may result in higher transaction costs due to the particularly poor internal governance
mechanism of firms in emerging markets. For example, Rajan, Servaes, & Zingales
(2000) and Scharfstein & Stein (2000) have respectively developed their own models to
characterise the real internal capital allocation process and have reached the similar
conclusion: the capital within diversified groups is allocated among divisions not so
much on the basis of divisional efficiency as on that of complex ‘political’ interaction
among headquarter officers and division managers, which leads funds to be transferred
from stronger divisions to weaker ones.
What’s more, the cost of diversification can also stem from managers’ empire-building
desires for their private benefits of control, another manifestation of the prevalent agency
problem (Shleifer & Vishny, 1989). In other words, firms may have gone beyond their
optimal sizes as their managers deliberately diversifies business in a way to entrench and
benefit themselves at the expense of shareholders value.
Our empirical result again lends support to the negative hypothesis of corporate
diversification in the Chinese context. Managers in state-controlled companies, like their
counterparts in wildly held corporations, have their own utility functions quite different
from the interests of the whole company group. Moreover, since the state lacks both an
effective incentive scheme such as managerial shareholding plan and a well-functioning
managerial labour market to align managers’ interests with those of shareholders, it is
managers’ rational choice to focus on the pursuit of various pecuniary and non-pecuniary
private benefits of control, which are precisely an increasing function of, among others,
firm size. Consequently, diversified companies may choose to establish or hold a public
traded company not according to pure business consideration, but for serving the
managers’ private interests. And even if on some occasions it is justifiable for a
diversified group to hold a PLC from the business point of view, it could be expected a
priori, from the above discussion about the internal capital misallocation hypothesis, that
the performance of the PLC is only secondary to the interests of the entire business
group, whereas a PLC controlled by a specialised firm may exhibit a better performance
record due to a larger degree of convergence of interests with its holding firm. Put
differently, profits earned and funds raised from the PLCs are more likely to be
transferred to their holing companies if they are diversified groups, since there is a
natural tendency for them to tap money from the PLCs they control to subsidise their
other subsidiaries.
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Table 5.  Performance Comparison Between the Wholly Listed Company
Shareholdings and the Partial Listed Company Shareholdings
(Shareholding Class 211-1 vs Shareholding Class 211-2)
EVA per
firm
(million
yuan)
Profits per
firm
(million
yuan)
EVA-
Capital
Ratio
Profit-
Asset
ratio
Profit
margin
Sales
growth
No of
observat
ions
Wholly-
Listed
(Std Dev)
-12.325
(70.877)
89.898
(106.44)
-0.006
(0.053)
0.094
(0.059)
0.266
(0.148)
1.35
(1.594)
567
Partial-
Listed
(Std Dev)
-13.618
(72.626)
69.448
(98.405)
-0.014
(0.058)
0.084
(0.069)
0.25
(0.145)
1.32
(1.161)
828
P-value 0.742 0.0009 0.011 0.004 0.02 0.712
The significant underperformance of partially listed corporations relative to the wholly
listed corporations, as suggested in table 5, may be explained as follows: On the one
hand, from the traditional agency perspective, one of the crucial distinctions of the
partially listed companies from the wholly listed ones is that, there is an additional
agency chain between the ultimate principal of the state and the downstream listed
companies. That is, while the managers in the wholly listed companies are directly
involved in the listed companies’ business, in the partially listed case managers in the
industrial holding companies would further delegate their control of the business in listed
companies to another group of managers15. Intuitively, other things being equal, agency
costs would rise with the increase of principal-agent chains, especially when various
incentive alignment mechanisms, such as management stock options and ownership, are
not generally put in place in China.
Apart from the perspective of the agency chain argument, the inside-outside agency view
may also provide compelling explanation. The wholly listed companies is controlled by
an inside agency who is delegated the voting power by the ultimate owner of state to
direct the use of assets. In contrast, the partially listed companies is controlled by a
outside corporate agency who is in turn to employ another corporate agency to operate
business under the outside agency’s authority. Although the latter management may be
argued for being conducive to monitoring, its side effects of the lower intensity of effort,
or the higher motivation to tunnelling resources to other places due to different interests
on business between the two agencies, may offset the positive impacts.
In fact, the asset stripping from partially listed companies to other uses is widely reported
in China, which can adversely affect the growth of the company and its long-run
performance. For example, the large corporatised SOEs, such as the Sinopec, are
common to raise external funds for subsidising their non-profitable subsidiaries and
                                                
15 Regarding the partially listed example in section 3.1, only one board director in the Qilu Petrochemical
comes from Sinopec, its holding company, and most of the executive officers are managers of the
subsidiary company, in sharp contrast to the wholly listed case mentioned above.
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social welfare expenditures by pooling all its core business to create a listed company that
is under the parent company’s control. This explains largely why the tunnelling
behaviour of state-controlled group companies is quite prevalent that the Chinese stock
market has been called ‘a cash machine’ by which the state holding companies tap public
savings to finance their other poorly performed subsidiaries.
To mitigate tunnelling behaviour of state controlled companies, our empirical finding that
is consistent with the explanation above seems to suggest that, before full privatisation,
the control mechanism of wholly listed companies should be considered for promotion to
other quoted companies.
Overall, the nested performance comparison conducted through Table 2 to 5 enables us
to rank out the least inefficient shareholding class from the 8 different categories, and the
final result is the holding companies that are wholly listed and have focused industrial
business through the indirect state control of their downstream public corporations.
IV. Conclusions
Based on the principle of the ultimate ownership and control that is suggested by La
Porta et al (1999), the paper establishes a new analytical framework on the shareholding
structure of Chinese quoted companies and finds that the main feature of the structure is
state dominance in terms of both the number of state ultimately controlled firms in the
stock market and the proportion of the voting shares. On the other hand, although the
private ultimate-controlled corporations are small at present, only 16% in 2001, it still
raises a question that needs further scrutiny: is the current state-dominant shareholding
structure in Chinese public companies transitional or endurable?
In contrast to the shareholdings given by the paper, the Chinese official reported
shareholdings of the state or the legal persons are ambiguous in identifying ultimate
owners of corporations. For instance, the absence of state shares shown in a company’s
annual report does not necessarily indicate the non-existence of the ultimate control by
state. And the class of legal person shares is just a cover of various identities of ultimate
owners including both state and private. This ambiguity has seriously misled many
previous studies in assessing the impact of shareholding classes on performance.
Based on our newly established shareholding classes, we compared performance of four
different pair-classes: the state direct control versus the state indirect control, the state
industrial company shareholdings versus the state solely owned asset management
company shareholdings, the focused or specialised company shareholdings versus the
diversified company shareholdings, and the wholly listed company shareholdings versus
the partial listed company’s parent shareholdings. The performance comparison of
different classes of shareholdings on the Chinese companies exhibits consistent and
significant evidence that the class of shareholding does matter for performance. The least
inefficient shareholding class among the 8 different classes ranked by the study is the
indirect state control of the wholly listed industrial companies with focused business as
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the controlling shareholder of the public corporations. This finding provides public
corporations with a lesson to think of how to improve their corporate control mechanism,
and the same is true for China’s government on how to choose an efficient shareholding
structure while trying to maintain the ultimate control of the state.
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